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Abstract: 
The ongoing process of European integration is likely to increase trade and factor mobility 
thereby increasing interregional competition and affecting the interregional division of 
labour. From a theoretical standpoint, particularly on the basis of the New Economic 
Geography (NEG), rising specialization and polarization of European regions could result 
from this process, and could entail a growing core-periphery-divide of regional income. 
Hence, there may be winning and losing regions of the integration process, according to 
the way industrial concentration and regional specialization takes place.  
Such a supposition evokes questions on the need of an accompanying compensatory 
regional policy, and whether it can be justified from an efficiency and/or distributional 
perspective. Also, questions arise as to the adequate design of such compensatory regional 
policy. 
We find that a case for regional policy cannot be excluded, but that the EU largely 
overstates any requirements for such a policy at that administrative level, and that it should 
abandon from co-financing of policy measures with unclear accountability and from direct 
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The ongoing process of European integration is likely to increase trade and factor mobility 
thereby increasing interregional competition and affecting the interregional division of 
labour. From a theoretical standpoint, particularly on the basis of the New Economic 
Geography (NEG), rising specialization and polarization of European regions could result 
from this process, and could entail a growing core-periphery-divide of regional income. 
Hence, there may be winning and losing regions of the integration process, according to 
the way industrial concentration and regional specialization takes place. Integration of 
European states, although beneficial to overall economic welfare, inhibits a certain risk of 
resulting in regional polarisation and in an increasing core-periphery income differential 
within the integration area, as will be shown below.  
Such a supposition evokes questions on the need of an accompanying compensatory 
regional policy, and whether it can be justified from an efficiency and/or distributional 
perspective. Also, questions arise as to the adequate design of such compensatory regional 
policy. 
The paper starts reviewing the case for regional policy in Europe on theoretical and 
empirical grounds. It then discusses some options for an efficient European regional 
policy, and  compares it to the actual EU regional policy. 
2.  The case for regional policy in the process of European 
integration 
2.1.  Reasons for regional policy intervention  
There are many worries, particularly at EU institutions, that progressing integration in the 
EU, be it by a deepening or a widening of the union, would deteriorate the cohesion of 
countries and regions within this union. Among others, the EU Commission, the EU 
Parliament, and the EU Committee of the Regions repeatedly stressed the need for 
cohesion of countries and regions in the process of integration and targeted the EU 
structural policies, including regional policy, towards this end. 
Yet, there is no clear cut definition of cohesion; rather, there coexist a number of differing 
concepts of cohesion. Traditionally, the EU Commission used to speak of economic and 
social cohesion. According to the EU Commission’s “Second Report on Economic and 
Social Cohesion” (2001), economic cohesion seems to be understood concerning income 4 
prospects of regions, whereas social cohesion seems to be understood concerning 
employment opportunities. More recently, the term “territorial cohesion” entered the 
agenda. An enumerating definition of territorial cohesion is to be found in the EU 
Commission’s “Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion”.1 Accordingly, it seems 
to be the enclosing term to the concepts of economic and social cohesion, including further 
items of political concern. It would thus imply another extension of cases calling forth for 
financial support by the EU. We would, however suggest another view of regional 
cohesion that would be less oriented on results and more on basic conditions and frames of 
regional economies. Such a new view could also be the basis of a new perception of 
regional policy. 
From a purely economic point of view, regional policy can be regarded as an active policy 
intervention into the economic process in favour of certain regions. Quite generally, policy 
interventions are traditionally justified by allocative, distributive or stabilisation oriented 
reasons. We may concentrate on the former two reasons the latter being less relevant at the 
regional level. The allocative problem consists of achieving an efficient allocation of 
economic resources within and between the regions. Foremost, it requires to define a frame 
for economic activity such that all costs and benefits related to economic decisions are 
internalised to the market process. This could be understood as providing territorial 
cohesion in the sense of defining equal and fair basic conditions for all regional economies. 
Only in specific, well-founded cases without efficient market solutions, direct steering 
interventions into the market process may be required. The distributive problem deals with 
changing the outcome of the market process according to concomitant perceptions of a just 
intra- and interregional income distribution, thereby mending a perhaps detracted social 
cohesion. This may be done ex post via redistributive measures such as taxes and transfers 
or ex ante via trying to influence the market process such that the intended outcome arises. 
Accordingly, for the process of European integration, we can set up a case for 
compensatory regional policy if  
–  integration produces market failure such as lock-ins or poverty traps for regions out of 
which they cannot escape on their own, or severe inter- or intraregional externalities 
that hurt the conditions-oriented cohesion and require allocative corrections; 
                                                            
1   Six priorities with an “important territorial dimension for Europe’s cohesion policy” are enumerated: (i) 
support of least developed regions, (ii) pursuit of a strategy for cohesion and sustainable development in 
urban areas, (iii) diversification of rural areas, (iv) cross-border, transnational and interregional 
cooperation, (v) support of areas undergoing industrial restructuring, and (vi) support of areas with severe 
geographical or natural disadvantages (EU Commission 2001). 5 
–  integration produces an increase of the regional income differential, a severe 
polarisation of regional incomes, that may be regarded as being socially unacceptable, 
i.e., hurting the results-oriented cohesion, and may thus give reason for distributive 
corrections. 
Hence, compensatory regional policy could be justified particularly, if we would face a 
polarisation of regions and an aggravation of regional cohesion related to increasing 
integration. The question remains whether there is any danger for cohesion to aggravate in 
the process of integration. 
2.2.  Theoretical considerations on the likeliness of polarisation  
For long, integration in economic theory, at least in its mainstream, was not perceived to be 
much of a problem for regional cohesion. According to neoclassical trade theory, economic 
integration fosters a division of labour according to comparative advantages, raises the 
overall welfare as well as the welfare of each country or region involved in the process, 
and equalises factor prices. In this analytical framework, it was taken for granted that 
convergence of countries and regions is to be expected. Translated into political advice for 
policy makers the basic message could read like this: Regional policy will, at best, only 
speed up a convergence process, which would presumably happen anyway.  
Since the 1980s, however, emerging new theories, particularly the new economic 
geography (NEG), have put the opportunities and risks associated with the integration 
process in a new perspective. The equalisation of factor prices does no longer turn out to 
be standard result. Producers can retain rents and free trade would, similarly to standard 
neo-classical reasoning, enhance welfare globally but – and this is the new message – not 
necessarily for all participating countries (or regions, respectively).  
NEG takes into consideration factor mobility, and thus endogenises factor endowments of 
regions (for a comprehensive presentation see Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999; see 
also Ottaviano and Puga 1997). Mobile factors (workers or firms) choose their location 
according to existing centripetal and centrifugal forces and become the engine of any 
agglomeration process: due to their migration a location may enter into a circular 
cumulative process of increasing agglomeration. The centripetal forces are technical 
increasing returns to scale, localisation economies, urbanisation economies, as well as 
home market and price index effects that — due to the saving of transport costs — increase 
factor incomes in agglomerations the more, the larger the agglomeration already is. Acting 
in an opposite direction, there are the centrifugal forces: scarcity of immobile factors, 6 
congestion costs, and the competition effect that — due to an increased supply of 
competing products — exerts the more pressure on factor incomes, the larger the 
agglomeration is.  
The balance between centripetal and centrifugal forces changes as the degree of integration 
increases, i.e., as transaction and transportation costs decrease. While high transportation 
costs act as a trade barrier for each region against product competition from abroad, this 
isolation at the same time increases the potential for intra-regional product competition, 
thus discouraging an in-migration of production factors. In this situation, a stable spatial 
equilibrium evolves where all economic activities are dispersed evenly across all regions.  
With transportation costs achieving a medium level, the related outward protection of the 
regions becomes less effective. This offers scope for exploiting scale economies, and trade 
sets in. The centripetal forces induce an agglomeration process toward an extreme 
allocation where all industries with increasing returns (IRS industries) take place in just 
one region. Integration thus evolves a core-periphery system where the economic centre 
(core region) gets specialised in such IRS industries with monopolistic competition. These 
industries inhibit a high income potential for the core-region and open perspectives for a 
further process of endogenous growth. By contrast, the periphery will get specialised in 
what is left, industries with constant returns, perfect competition, and a low income 
potential that are not subject to concentration (figure 1). At this intermediate stage, 
integration may thus bring about a sharp core-periphery divide regarding income and 
growth thereby aggravating the cohesion of regions. Which region becomes the core region 
within the model is due to random chance or infinitesimal differences.  
Finally, with transportation costs declining even further, agglomeration stops being 
advantageous as scale economies can be exploited from any place in space. Rather, within 
the agglomerated core region, a vigorous product competition dampens real wages and 
drives workers out of the centre towards the peripheral region. Approximately, increasing 
integration may be characterised by an U-shaped evolution path, leading from dispersion 
of the IRS industries to concentration and back to dispersion, accompanied by a first 
increasing then decreasing core-periphery divide of income. 7 
Figure 1 —Regional specialisation at different levels of transport costs — 2 sectors/2 
regions 
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Source: Own illustration 
To complete the view on regional specialisation, it has to be stressed that, of course, 
location decisions are taken in an interaction between such agglomeration-inducing forces 
outlined in NEG and traditional natural and comparative advantages outlined in Ricardian, 
and Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson models,2 and it cannot be stated ex ante which of these 
influences may dominate the other. Natural comparative advantages may determine 
regional specialisation the more evidently, the more heterogeneous regions are with respect 
to immobile factor endowments, the less pronounced technologies of increasing returns 
are, and the more distinctly integration has proceeded from an intermediate toward a high 
degree.  
A basic message of NEG is hence that economic integration may ultimately bring about 
convergence of income per capita levels. Yet, the process may take a long time and it 
cannot be taken for sure that a degree of integration sufficient to enter the dispersion stage 
will be achieved. There are certain barriers to integration that will persist in spite of all 
institutional and technical progress in reducing them: e.g., geographic distances (relevant 
in particular for the movement of goods and persons), language, cultural and institutional 
differences. If integration comes to a standstill at an intermediate stage of integration, 
decreasing regional cohesion remains a possibility that needs to be taken seriously. From 
this, one could infer a distribution oriented case for policy measures such as interregional 
transfers in order to share the aggregate gains from integration across all countries and 
regions. Also, there may be an allocation oriented argument in favour of regional policy: 
Like the traditional neoclassical theory from which it is derived, NEG deduces equilibrium 
market solutions where the economy at any stage of integration is in overall optimum. 
However, in contrast to traditional neoclassical theory, such an overall optimum need not 
be an optimum for any region involved. By specific measures in favour of IRS industries 
                                                            
2  In NEG models, in general, space is assumed to be homogeneous. 8 
regions can attain a strategic edge over other regions, and this constitutes a strategic 
argument for an active regional policy. The arbitrariness of the concentration process and 
the existence of hysteresis in cumulative causation strongly support this argument.  
However, there are two major objections to these arguments that concern (i) the uniqueness 
of results and (ii) the  efficacy of policy measures in correcting the results.  
(i) The outcome of integration on theoretical grounds is rather ambiguous as it depends on 
the starting point of the integration process as well as on the assumptions of the model 
chosen.  
Even if concentration of IRS industries proceeds at few locations this does not necessarily 
imply regional polarisation. Considering more than one IRS industry, the NEG analysis 
becomes more differentiated (figure 2). In this case, when moving toward a state with very 
low transport costs, there is no return to a dispersion of all industries. Instead, we find each 
region getting specialised in one of the IRS industries. By this location of industries, it is 
possible to take advantage of scale economies internal to a branch, while at the same time 
easing external diseconomies of scale such as competition for immobile factors.3 From a 
theoretical standpoint, the pattern of regional specialisation becomes the more complex the 
more regions and industries are included. Industries with increasing returns will tend to 
develop decentralised clusters, each at only few locations, instead of becoming dispersed 
evenly. Such clusters will become the more likely the lower transportation costs get. 
Hence, more and more regions will host some of these industries and will be able to take 
advantage of their income potential. Although the degree of regional specialisation may 
increase (Ottaviano and Puga 1997, Puga 1999), there is no polarisation of income and no 
obvious need for compensatory regional policy. 
                                                            
3   Dluhosch (2000) stresses the significance of such centrifugal forces, particularly the influence of 
competition. According to her view, if competition grows due to integration, it may increasingly split 
production into separate components which may then be manufactured at various scattered locations. 
Hence, integration may not „per se promote a centre-periphery pattern“ but rather „provide the 
opportunity to reap the benefits of a finer (vertical) division of labour which can be shared among trading 
partners.“ (p. 158) 9 
Figure 2 —Regional specialisation at different levels of transport costs — 3 sectors/2 
regions 
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Source: Own illustration. 
Also, sharp polarisation is less likely, if we assume other engines of agglomeration instead 
of labour mobility, e.g., migration of firms, as some NEG models do (Krugman and 
Venables 1995, Venables 1996, Markusen and Venables 1999). Such assumption seems 
much more appropriate for the European case. In these models, the centripetal forces are 
somewhat constrained as there is no comparable accumulation of consumers. Competition 
for workers will strongly raise wages in the central region, and this will force industries 
with a lower potential for scale economies to move toward the periphery, thereby easing 
the competitive pressure in the central region. A lack of interregional labour mobility can 
thus „sustain non-extreme equilibria in which all regions have industry, even if in different 
proportions.“ (Puga 2001:17; cf. also Braunerhjelm et al. 2000:28f). Again, with less 
polarization, there is less need for compensatory regional policy.   
Due to the non-monotonic relationship between integration and polarisation which makes 
it difficult to tell what part of the function we’re on, and due to the dependency of the 
results from the degree of labour mobility we do not know what will be the outcome from 
increasing integration, whether, on the one hand, and extreme polarisation sis likely and 
whether, on the other hand, the stage of dispersion and income conversion is attainable at 
all. There are hence a number of different possible outcomes, e.g.:4 
−  increasing specialisation + increasing concentration of IRS industries in the core + 
increasing polarisation, or  
−  increasing specialisation + movement of industries between core and periphery in both  
directions + moderate increase of polarisation, or  
                                                            
4   Braunerhjelm et al. (2000:xiv, 29f) subsume their analyses in three different types of outcome from 
integration: the dispersion, the concentration, and the regional stagnation outcome, and consider only the 
latter to contrast regional equality. 10 
−  increasing specialisation + increasing dispersion of IRS industries + decreasing 
polarisation, or 
−  decreasing specialisation + increasing diversification  + decreasing polarisation. 
It is difficult to decide whether we need regional policy or just further steps of integration 
and further reductions of transaction costs. 
(ii) Policy measures may not be adequate to correct the results but even aggravate the 
situation of disfavoured regions. 
If policy measures aim at containing the process of concentration, this may have adverse 
effects on overall endogenous growth and likewise on the growth of peripheral regions 
(Puga 2001). The increase of competition of goods and factors related to integration and 
concentration works towards a reduction of goods prices and an increase of  consumer 
income, at the core as well as at the periphery (Combes and Linnemer 2000). Hence, 
according to the measures applied, regional policy may even act to the detriment of 
peripheral regions. 
In particular, policy measures that aim at expanding the regional infrastructure, e.g., traffic 
networks, may reduce transportation costs thereby mitigating the outward protection of 
remote regions related to high transportation costs and resulting in a sell-out of their 
production. Or, when taking the form of ameliorating the educational infrastructure, this 
may  increase the qualification of labour thereby increasing their mobility and resulting in 
a brain drain. In these cases, the peripheral regions would be better off without regional 
policy (Ph. Martin 1998). 
Moreover, it is assumed that in the stage of increasing agglomeration the self-reinforcing 
forces would be so strong that any policy measures aimed at stopping or reversing this 
trend would have to be extremely strong, too. Hence, such a policy would be very costly 
and any related adverse effects would also be very strong (Ph. Martin 1998). 
To resume, from a theoretical standpoint, the case for regional policy, though not 
completely unreasonable, depends on circumstances and is flawed by several objections, 
reservations, and restraints. These have to be observed particularly, when designing 
regional policy measures. Moreover, of course, any suggestion derived from theory 
depends on the empirical relevance of the theory.  11 
2.3.  Empirical evidence for the likeliness of polarization in Europe 
Considering the relevance of the NEG perspective in explaining integration related 
processes of regional specialisation and industrial concentration, it has to be stated that 
compared to the increasingly sophisticated theoretical approaches empirical analysis is 
lagging behind. This applies in particular for econometric tests on the relevance of NEG 
models.5  
There are, however, investigations on the evolution of specialisation in the course of the 
West European integration process so far. This process of European integration may be 
accounted for as an economic experiment without precedent in modern economic history. 
It offers an outstanding field for empirical research on the effects of integration. In the last 
two decades, three major integration steps have been taken: the south enlargement in 
1981/1986, the completion of the Single Market in 1992, and the north enlargement in 
1995 (the creation of the European Monetary Union in 1999/2002 still being too recent for 
analysis). It is thus much worthwhile to look what has happened to the division of labour 
between countries and regions during this period. 
2.3.1. Review of existing literature 
Most of the existing investigations on the evolution of specialisation in West Europe refer 
to the national level and study in particular the manufacturing sector. Accordingly, overall 
specialisation of EU member states seems to have increased in the 1970s and 1980s, 
starting from a remarkably low level at the end of the 1960s as compared to US states 
(Hufbauer and Chilas 1974, Molle and Boeckhout 1995, Amiti 1999, Brülhart 1998, Walz 
1999). This increase, however, seems to occur at a very slow pace, and as the result of 
quite divergent processes, some acting toward concentration others toward dispersion of 
industries (Middelfart-Knarvig, Overman, Redding, and Venables 2000). Moreover, it has 
been shown that the localisation of IRS industries seems to have increased, i.e., industrial 
clusters emerged (Brülhart 1998). Particularly regarding the effects of the Single Market 
Programme, Ziltener (2002) draws a rather pessimistic resume:  
As to the evolution of specialisation on a regional level, there is still a severe lack of 
empirical results, which is primarily due to a lack of data on European regions in a 
                                                            
5   See, however, the work by Davis and Weinstein (1996, 1999) who tested the relevance of home market 
effects and found them to be significant in the case of (Japanese) regions, but not in the case of (OECD-) 
countries. See also Ellison and Glaeser (1997) who tested the relevance of agglomerative forces against 
random chance („dartboard approach“) in the process of concentration and found US industries to be 
considerably more concentrated than random chance alone would explain. 12 
sufficiently disaggregated industrial breakdown and covering a sufficient number of years. 
Some studies show localisation of the manufacturing sector as a whole to have increased 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Molle 1980, Brülhart 1998, Walz 1999). Simultaneously, 
the concentration of the manufacturing sector at existing agglomeration centres diminished 
while peripheral regions entered into a catching-up process (Krieger, Thoroe, and 
Weskamp 1985, Waniek 1995, Brülhart 1998). One may conclude, that the manufacturing 
sector seems to have withdrawn from the centres and localised at the periphery in 
decentralised industrial clusters. Accordingly, the core-periphery-divide loses significance 
— which would be in line with NEG predictions.  
However, these investigations refer to the manufacturing sector as a whole. They need to 
be supplemented by more detailed analyses of regional specialisation within the 
manufacturing sector, and, also, within the services sector. A first step into this direction 
has been taken by Hallet (2002). In contrast to the studies on national specialisation, he 
finds specialisation of European regions to have been decreasing since the 1980s. This has 
to be seen, however, against the backdrop of a flat sectoral breakdown:6 The formation of 
highly specialised decentralised clusters (say, at the level of branches or even product 
varieties), as formulated by NEG, implies a growing dispersion of broad sectors. In another 
study for the case of Spain, Paluzie, Pons and Tirado (2001) also detect regional 
specialisation to decrease rather than increase.7 At any rate, like the studies on national 
specialisation, Hallet (2002) as well as Paluzie, Pons and Tirado (2001) find any process of 
concentration / deconcentration to be very slow. 
2.3.2. Own research results for French and Spanish regions 
To analyse the spatial division of labour and the location of industries in deep sectoral 
detail requires to take recourse to nationally available data for EU member states, since no 
such data set at the European regional level exists that is internationally comparable. In 
building such a data set, we started collecting employment figures for France for some 
selected years from 1973 to 1996 broken down into 21 regions and 35 manufacturing 
branches and for Spain for years from 1981 to 1992 broken down into 18 regions and 
almost 80 manufacturing branches. For these data, we provide some descriptive statistics. 
For convenience, the two major integration events of the observation period are signified, 
the south enlargement when Spain entered the EU and France got a new intra-EU 
                                                            
6  Hallet (2000) used existing data for European regions by Eurostat which are broken down into 17 sectors, 
including agriculture, 9 industrial branches, and 5 service branches. 
7   This study is based on INE data for 50 Spanish provinces and 30 manufacturing industries. 13 
neighbour, and the completion of the single market when all intra-EU borders should have 
gotten less relevant.  
Both for French and Spanish regions, Herfindahl indices have been calculated which 
compare a given regional structure to a situation where all industries have equal shares 
(figure 3).8 Quite in line with other empirical studies on specialisation we find most 
regions, particularly such with a low degree of specialisation, to reveal only slow variation, 
even over a period of more than 20 years as in the case of France. A narrow majority of all 
regions in France and Spain experienced a moderate overall increase of specialisation as 
expected from NEG theory. For several of these regions, particularly those situated at the 
French South, this overall increase was the result of a first-decrease-then-increase 
evolution, an U-type evolution. Less than one half of all regions in France and Spain 
experienced a decrease of specialisation, most remarkably those that had been highly 
specialised in the past like the mining and steel regions (Lorraine, Nord-Pas de Calais and 
Asturias).9 No obvious influence of the south enlargement or the single market program 
can be detected. This interpretation, however, should be counterchecked by an econometric 
analysis which is still ahead. Accordingly, the evolution of regional specialisation does not 
pursue any simple and uniform path. Also, it does not by itself answer the question of an 
aggravating regional cohesion. 
To this end, it is useful to also have a look at the location of IRS industries across regions 
since these industries are most relevant with respect to income perspectives of regions. We 
analysed the significance of IRS industries in French and Spanish regions and its evolution, 
applying a classification by Pratten (1988; figure 4)10. In case of a concentration process, 
one would expect the significance of the IRS sector to increase in one or a few regions and  
 
                                                            




2 , where ai  are industrial shares of an economy under investigation, 1 1 n h ≤≤ , and where a 
region is the more specialised the higher the indicator is. For an overview on different measures of 
specialisation and their specific properties, see Amiti (1999) and Krieger-Boden (1999). The results 
depend to a considerable degree on the specialisation index chosen. 
9   A few regions ended up in their overall result after a first-increase-then-decrease evolution, which may be 
taken as an inverted U-curve (e.g., Franche-Comté, Auvergne, Asturias). 
10 There exists a number of studies applying various methods to characterize industries according to the 
relevance of scale economies. We draw on a study which tries to measure scale economies (Pratten 1988, 
cf. annexe table A1; see also Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat 1996) whereas other studies conclude 
on scale economies from the degree of localisation of industries (e.g., Ellison and Glaeser 1997, 
particularly for France see Maurel and Sédillot 1999). See also OECD (1987) distinguishing five 
categories of industries: scale-intensive industries, science-based industries, industries producing 
differentiated goods, labour-intensive industries, and resource- intensive industries.  For an overview see 
Junius 1999. 14 
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a Classification of industries according to Pratten 1988 
Source: SESSI. — INE; TEMPUS Bancos de Datos. — Own calculations. 
to decrease in all others, and vice versa for the CRS sector. This would be accompanied by 
an increased polarisation of income perspectives. By contrast, a spread of IRS industries 
across regions, as demonstrated in figure 2, would imply the significance of both IRS and 
CRS industries to converge between regions, and the income perspectives of regions to 
converge, too. 
By our figures, the observation is confirmed that any change of specialisation is slow: we 
find only slight variation over time regarding the significance of the different types of 
industries within the regions. This moderate variation indicates more dispersion of IRS 
industries than concentration, since the shares of the types of industries seem to converge 
rather than diverge. Overall, the shares of IRS industries seem not to increase significantly. 
There seem to emerge certain “clubs” of regions, each with a different significance of these 
industries.11 It even looks like this trend has become more relevant since the south 
                                                            
11  Hence, for France, one may identify a club made up of Franche-Comté, Provence-Côte d’Azur-Corse, Île 
de France, Haute Normandie and Aquitaine, another one made up of Bretagne, Basse Normandie, Poitou-
Charentes, Centre, Nord-Pas de Calais, and Picardie, also one consisting of Pays de la Loire, Rhône-
Alpes, Bourgogne, Lorraine, and one consisting of Champagne-Ardenne, Auvergne, and Limousin end. 
For Spain, we find one club containing Galicia, Madrid, Castilla-León, and Cataluña, and another one 









enlargement of the EU. In reversal, as a resulting effect for the other industries, not 
regarded as being “IRS”, we find slight tendencies towards dispersion, too.  
With some reservations, one may argue that these results are in a certain consistency with 
the theoretical considerations. They do not exactly support the imputation of ever growing 
polarisation resulting from integration. Rather, we may expect a though very slight 
tendency towards a conversion of regional income perspectives due to the dispersion of 
IRS industries across regions, and due to emerging clusters of single IRS industries all over 
the countries. Much uncertainty regarding the relation between integration and regional 
specialisation, however, remains and requires much more empirical research. Also, there is 
as yet no clear empirical evidence that regional income and growth are indeed related to 
the degree of regional specialisation and of dispersion of IRS industries, as described.  
2.4.  Resume: Challenge from European integration for regional policy 
Bearing in mind the theoretical considerations and the existing, a bit sporadic empirical 
evidence, European integration so far seems not to have deteriorated regional cohesion to a 
very disquieting degree. From this, what challenges can we expect to result from the new 
steps of integration on the agenda, the very recent formation of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) and the envisaged east enlargement of the EU? 
Both events are once more likely to influence the division of labour between European 
countries and regions. The formation of EMU marks an important step in the process of 
European integration. It eliminates the possibility of adjusting national nominal exchange 
rates and it reduces transaction costs connected to the existence of different currencies (i.e. 
costs of information, conversion and hedging) thereby reducing transaction costs. As a 
result, EMU leads to a reduction of price flexibility putting strain on regional labour 
markets, to a reaction of labour market flexibility, to an increase of trade links, and to a 
change of regional centrality. What will result from EMU to the stability, as well as to the 
employment, income and growth of European regions is ambiguous, and it is equivocal ex 
ante which regions are likely to be winners or losers of the process. At the core of this 
ambiguity is the question of how the industrial specialisation of regions changes in the 
process of integration. Regional specialisation, in turn, affects the susceptibility of regions 
to asymmetric shocks, and the core-periphery divide of regional incomes, and may thus be 
taken as a key determinant for integration effects on regions (Krieger-Boden 2002). 
The envisaged east enlargement at any rate will increase the variety of regions 
tremendously, with respect to their economic and social development level as well as to 17 
their legislative and administrative settings and their factor endowments. Whereas the band 
width, e.g., of regional per capita income now reaches from … to … of the community 
average, it will reach from .. to .. within the community of 25 member states. Also, 
unemployment rates will vary quite more in a community of the 25 than in the community 
of the 12. Legislation, administration and support of regions differ significantly between 
old and new member states, also, the differences regarding their factor endowment with 
human and physical capital, and with infrastructure such as traffic routes, education 
opportunities, and health care are large. Hence, the enlargement produces an initial 
aggravation of the level of regional cohesion. Moreover, the enlargement inhibits a sudden 
change of transaction costs between incumbent and accession countries. According to 
Lejour, de Mooij, and Nahuis (2001) this initial enlargement shock has three dimensions: 
the formation of a customs union (which is more or less achieved already) with less 
barriers towards EU member states, but in some cases, more barriers towards external 
states, the accession to the internal market with mutual recognition of different technical 
regulations, minimum requirements and harmonisation of regulations, and the free 
movement labour.12 As a result, a new equilibrium of the division of labour is called forth. 
This process could be accompanied by severe perturbations such as a brain drain of high-
qualified workers from accession countries, out-migration of low-qualified jobs from 
incumbent members, processes of affiliation in accession countries. Again, the division of 
labour and the specialisation of regions proves to be a major determinant of integration 
effects. 
However, it is difficult to estimate how far-reaching the adjustment procedures will turn 
out to be. If we consider the empirical results on earlier integration steps, we would not 
expect the effects of these new steps to be very disturbing. Even the south enlargement, an 
integration step that compares quite good to the east enlargement, appears to have had only 
little immediate impact on the specialisation of, e.g., Spain and France, areas that ought to 
be heavily affected. One possible explanation may be that intra-EU labour mobility is 
continuously declining in spite of huge regional differentials particularly with respect 
tounemployment (Braunerhjelm et al. 2000). This low labour mobility in Europe may 
prevent from extreme polarisation in the future, too. Still, the east enlargement, in 
particular, may be an even wider step than any other before since the heterogeneity of 
development levels between incumbents and accession countries may be larger than ever.   
                                                            
12   On the basis of a CGE model for the world economy, Lejour, de Mooij and Nahuis (2001) estimate 
sectoral effects to be particularly significant in the case of ...Overall, they estimate large gains of 
accession for the accession countries and modest welfare improvements for incumbent members. 18 
3. Compensatory  EU  regional policy – requirements and 
reality 
3.1.  Requirements for an efficient regional policy in the process of 
integration 
If we allow that due to the general uncertainties of our findings both on theoretical and 
empirical grounds a case for an allocative as well as an distributive regional policy cannot 
be excluded, we will then ask, in what way this policy should be organised, and we will 
sketch a few guiding principles for an optimal design of structural policies with a regional 
dimension. Our considerations will regard the question of the efficient administrative level 
for regional policy, and the question of efficient instruments for regional policy. 
(i) Choice of efficient level of administration for regional policy measures 
On which administration level should any policies toward regional cohesion be 
implemented — at EU level, level of national, or even regional or local authorities? Some 
major principles for an optimal division of policy prerogatives between different layers of 
administration may be derived from public choice theory, particularly from fiscal 
federalism (Buchanan 1950, Oates 1972, 1999). 
According to the theory of fiscal federalism, each policy prerogative should be attributed to 
that level of administration that comes closest to representing the consumers of this policy 
(principle of subsidiarity). The lower the level of administration the larger is the potential 
of the people concerned to influence this policy according to their specific preferences — 
or to move to another location. Closely related is the other principle postulating that the 
prerogative of spending funds for  certain policy measures and the prerogative of raising 
these funds must be combined (principle of equivalence) in order to guarantee all benefits 
and costs of the measures being checked, and any financial illusion being avoided.  
In the case of spillovers from one region pursuing a certain policy to neighbouring regions, 
or in the case of economies of scale, it may, however, be useful to negotiate on it in order 
to internalise such externalities, or to decide on this policy at a more elevated level of 
administration (principle of coordination). Coordination by bilateral or multilateral 
negotiation would be preferable as long as the externalities concern only a selected number 
of regions that could be organised in clubs. Coordination by delegation to an elevated level 
of administration would be preferable in the case of externalities where club solutions are 
not feasible. Particularly in the latter case, the principle is in a certain conflict to the 19 
subsidiarity principle. Accordingly, „policies, where economies of scale and / or 
externalities are predominant should be allocated at the union level, or even at the world 
level. Instead, policy areas where heterogeneity of preferences are high relative to 
externalities should be allocated to a national or sub national level.“ (Alesina, Angeloni, 
Schuknecht 2001:1). Moreover, the principle of coordination stands in a tension to another 
one, a principle of competition in the sense of von Hayek: The existence of a variety of 
policy measures in different locations induces increases of efficiency, productivity and 
innovation of such policies. Coordination includes a restriction of competition that is the 
more detrimental the more dubious the externalities and their extent are (Klodt 1999).   
Hence, policy measures at the EU level surpassing local, regional or even national borders 
should be restricted to cases with very explicit union-wide externalities, with low 
heterogeneity of preferences, with a clear assignment of accountability in order to avoid a 
rise of financial illusion, and leaving scope to locational competition.  
(ii) Choice of efficient instruments for regional policy at EU level 
From this view, in order to offset adverse integration effects, an allocative policy could be 
justified as far as it exhibits an union-wide dimension. It’s not easy, however, to imagine 
projects that could answer this purpose. Generally, measures further lowering transaction 
costs and driving integration toward the stage of dispersion and cohesion would be 
appreciated. It could be argued in favour of eliminating trade barriers within the union, of 
ameliorating the trans-European transport and communication infrastructure (as far as it 
produces non-pecuniary externalities), of supporting trans-European networks of research, 
administration and commerce, of tearing down administrative overregulation, and of 
helping to spur bureaucratic procedures. A certain control of state aid granted by member 
states may also be helpful to reduce non-tariff barriers and to prevent a race on subsidies. 
Further, in order to reach the dispersion stage of integration, barriers to labour mobility 
ought to be removed. Yet, at an earlier stage of integration, it might be useful to keep these 
barriers to labour mobility in order to avoid a severe polarisation, thereby enabling 
peripheral regions to exploit a lower wage level as a locational advantage (p.9; Lammers 
and Stiller 2000). 
Also, in order to enable regions to escape lock-in situations, i.e., by ameliorating their 
factor endowment, an unconditioned financial instrument may be useful, supporting 
retarded or otherwise problematic regions. Yet, it is not useful for the EU administration to 
intervene itself directly into the economies of such regions. An interventionist regional 
policy usually takes the form of development programs and financial aids targeted either at 20 
private firms or at administrations that can apply for such assistance. Such policy works in 
a selective way and its effects are questionable since it requires a superior knowledge 
concerning the right way to economic success. If this right way is missed, the intended 
effect is accompanied and perhaps even superimposed by a number of further effects 
(Krieger-Boden und Lammers 1996): (i) In the case of windfall gains the intended effect 
would have occurred anyway, a funding is thus waste. (ii) In the presence of backward and 
forward linkages, the incidence of the aid may become effective in quite other industries 
and regions than is intended. (iii) Substitution effects induced by the aids may lead to a 
change  of allocation (e.g., an increase of capital intensity of productions) that is neither 
intended nor desirable. (iv) Funding effects result from the need to finance any state aid at 
the expense of other purposes. (v) Negative dynamic effects may arise because state aids 
favour moral hazard and lobbyism, and because they are often targeted toward selected 
industries and thus force a development path that may turn out to be unfavourable. These 
latter dynamic effects are most critical in that they may lead to a complete reversion of the 
intended objective of stepping up economic activity. The lack of knowledge required to 
efficiently direct such programs rules them out of the policy agenda, particularly at EU 
level. 
As far as redistributive objectives are concerned, a need for policy measures at EU level is 
altogether less convincing. A preference for equalisation of income is likely to be 
orientated much more  to a national or even regional yardstick than to an union-wide. We 
may assume, that most people are much more interested in comparing their standard of 
living to that of neighbours or fellow citizens in the same country than to that of any 
foreign people in far-off countries under quite different circumstances. Hence, 
redistribution can be regarded as a policy field with small externalities and large 
heterogeneity of preferences (Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht 2001), and it should thus 
be attributed to national or even regional  authorities rather than to the EU.  
Accordingly, the union should widely abandon itself from redistributive measures but 
allow for them at the national, regional or even local level. This will permit to differentiate 
between regions within a country, and will enable the incumbent member states to continue 
in dealing with their internal regional problems, such as east Germany or the Italian 
Mezzogiorno, problems that in most cases are not overcome. Again, a financial instrument 
favouring disfavoured areas or simply disfavoured persons — for not all persons in 
disfavoured regions are poor and deserve the support of persons from richer regions — would 
be most appropriate avoiding the traps hidden in interventionist policy. However, when 
regional policy is decentralised each nation and region could choose its own strategy and even 
experiment with different strategies in order to find the one that suits best its specific 21 
requirements. The EU could take the obligation of accompanying this procedure of discovery 
by protecting it against ruinous dumping practices, and by monitoring the diverse measures 
and their economic effects. Such a monitoring process could provide a platform for 
overcoming informational asymmetries with respect to efficient policy initiatives, help 
sharpening regional profiles, foster the recognition of the complex feedback relationships 
connected to policy measures, and induce institution-building particularly in accession 
countries (Soltwedel 2002). 
In order to pursue both the allocative as well as the redistributive objective on EU level, we 
argue hence for a triple strategy:  
−  Lowering transaction costs by further reducing remaining trade barriers; 
−  organizing unconditioned but limited financial transfers from rich to poor regions;  
−  allowing for locational competition of regions with a great variety of  regional settings, 
combined with a certain control against dumping practices, and with a monitoring 
process of policy measures and their economic effects. 
To this end, it may also be useful to link the EU policies towards regions with those of the 
national and regional authorities (e.g., by the guidelines of the “Competition” DG for the 
legitimacy of regional state aid). However, this triple strategy for EU regional policy 
would not cover a co-financing of policy measures with unclear accountability, nor any 
direct, project-bound interventions into the regional economies.  
3.2.  Actual EU regional policy 
The actual EU regional policy is based on two major pillars: the structural funds which are 
at least partially targeted at regional policy objectives, and the competition policy of the 
EU Commission which also aims at influencing regional policy via supervision of national 
regional aid. A short review will clarify in how far they meet the above requirements.  
3.2.1. The structural funds 
The evolution of the EU financial  instruments aimed at pursuing cohesion within the EU 
have always been closely related to the progress of integration. Since the start of the 
structural funds in 1960 (with the constitution of the European Social Fund, ESF) every 
step of integration was accompanied by the establishment of further funds, or an expansion 
of the monies with the aim to offset expected undesirable effects of integation. In 1975, in 
response to the first EU enlargement by Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark, the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was created. With the south enlargement of the EU 22 
in 1981/1986, and the completion of the single market programme in 1993, the ERDF was 
extended further (table 1). The recent formation of EMU gave reason to set up another 
structural policy instrument in 1993, the cohesion fund.13  
Table 1 —  On the evolution of the  EU structural funds and the EU cohesion funds 1985–
1999





















  Millions  ECU/Euro 
1985  937  –  2 524  2 224  –  5 685  – 
1986  995  –  3 339  2 554  –  6 888  – 
1987  1 044  –  3 693  3 150  –  7 887  – 
1988  1 203  –  3 838  2 899  –  7 940  – 
1989  1 465  –  4 710  3 520  –  9 695  – 
1990  1 976  –  5 342  4 100  –  11 419  – 
1991  2 427  53  6 725  4 530  –  13 734  – 
1992  2 897  81  8 394  5 683  –  17 055  – 
1993  3 101  76  10 074  5 955  –  19 205  1 500 
1994  3 302  380  9 769  5 841  1 949  21 547  1 750 
1995  3 374  451  10 684  6 711  2 916  24 408  2 000 
1996  3 772  450  11 834  7 150  2 989  26 587   
1997  4 026  491  12 990  7 639  3 173  28 625   
1998  4 183  464  14 148  8 733  2 781  30 624   
1999  5 233  695  15 869  9 520  4 480  36 039   
  Annual average rate of change in percent 
1985–1990 16,1  –  16,2  13,0  –  15,0  – 
1990–1995 11,3  70,8
d 14,9  10,4 
e  16,4 15,5
f 
1995–1999 .  .  .  .   6,3 6,8 
a„Verfügbare Verpflichtungsermächtigungen“. — 
b Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund. — 
c Such as INTERREG, URBAN, EQUAL, and LEADER; amounts included in the 




Source: EU Commission (1989), Manual on the Reform of the EU Structural Funds; — 
EU Commission (various issues), Annual Report on the Execution of the 
Structural Funds. — Own calculations. 
In preparing for the east enlargement, and in response to harsh criticism, the EU 
Commission submitted the Agenda 2000 that for once is aiming at the tightening and 
facilitating of EU structural policy. Also, it provides for a ceiling for total funds that is 
tantamount to reducing the funds directed to the incumbent members to the benefit of the 
                                                            
13 The cohesion fund is aimed at strengthening the cohesion of the EU by supporting projects of trans-
European significance in the fields of environmental protection and provision of traffic infrastructure. 
However, in effect, the distribution of the monies is oriented solely on the economic performance of the 
member states, and is hence restricted to Greece, Portugal and Ireland. 23 
accession countries. In fact, if the criteria for eligibility remain unchanged as envisaged, most 
of those regions supported by the EU so far may loose their eligibility after the accession.14  
What can be said on this structural policy of the EU at the background of the requirements 
for an efficient regional policy as derived above? First of all, the pure amount of structural 
policies aimed at the cohesion of countries and regions does not look much. In total, the 
structural funds account for about 0,4 per cent of EU GDP (in 1995). However, for 
countries like Ireland, Portugal and Greece these funds are more than a „quantité neglige-
able“ (table 2). Moreover, the funds have been quintupled within the decade of 1985 
to1995 and have been increased since at an annual average rate of change of 6–7 per cent 
(table 1). At the same time, the proportion of the union’s budget allocated to structural 
operations has increased from just 18 percent in 1987 to over one-third by 1999.  
Table 2  —  On the distribution of EU structural funds on EU member states, 1990-2000
a 
  Millions ECU  ECU per capita  per cent 
  1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 
Sweden  –  277   –  31,4   –  1,4  
Finland  –  304   –  59,5   –  1,6  
Denmark  77  95   15,0  18,2   0,7  0,5  
Germany  511  2  422   6,4  29,7   4,8  12,5  
Austria  –  301   –  37,4   –  1,5  
Netherlands  143  184   9,6  11,9   1,3 0,9   
Belgium  155  86   15,6  8,5   1,5  0,4  
Luxemburg 10  10   26,2  24,6   0,1  0,1  
Un. Kingdom  1 108  1 331    19,2  22,8    10,4  6,8   
Ireland  730  954   208,4  266,3   6,8  4,9  
France  1 282  1 327    21,7  22,8    11,6  6,8   
Italy  1  625  2  283   28,2 39,9   15,2 11,7   
Spain  2  836  5  837   72,8  148,9   26,6 30,0   
Portugal  1 067  1 380    107,8  127,8    10,0  7,1   
Greece  1 172  2 653    115,3  253,7   11,0 13,6   
Total  10 666  19 445    30,2  52,2    100,0  100,0   
a„Verpflichtungen — verfügbare Mittel“. This variable is not identical to the „Verpflichtungs-
ermächtigungen“ of table 1. 
Source: EU Commission (1989), Manual on the Reform of the EU Structural Funds; — 
EU Commission (various issues), Annual Report on the Execution of the 
Structural Funds. — Own calculations. 
                                                            
14  For the accession countries, since 2000, a new programme has been issued, the Instrument for Structural 
Policy for Pre-Accession (ISPA), as a transition to the cohesion fund.This programme adds to the 
programme PHARE issued in 1989 to support the East European transition process, and to the 
agricultural programme SAPARD issued in 2000. 24 
Even more important, the approach to regional policy within the EU has moved from a 
relatively passive stance supporting policy measures by member state governments to 
direct interventions for an active cohesion policy, and from an entitlement to reduce 
within-country regional disparities to the claim to smooth disparities in living standards 
across as well as within member states. As a result of subsequent reforms, the EU 
structural policy became more and more interventionist and cumbersome. At present, all 
structural funds are to achieve five economic objectives two of which can be regarded as 
being oriented toward regional policy:  
−  Objective 1: promoting the development and structural adjustment of retarded regions 
(with a per capita income below 75 percent of EU average); 
−  Objective 2: supporting economic and social conversion in regions with severe 
structural difficulties (with a level of unemployment above EU average);  
−  Objective 3: supporting the adaptation and modernisation of educational, vocational and 
employment systems. 
According to the programme oriented concept of the EU, each region eligible for support 
must establish a regional development plan to be updated every year, and containing inter 
alia information on the economic prospects of the regions, on the coordination with 
national structural policy, and on financial budgets. After negotiations with and permission 
by the commission, these plans are transformed into Common Support Frameworks 
(CSF).15 From these, operational programmes are derived and submitted to the EU 
Commission that contain the projects selected for support. The support granted by the EU 
structural funds follows strictly the principle of additionality thus directing national funds 
into EU regional policy, too. The EU Commission gets further scope for intervention via 
the so-called Community Initiatives and the Innovative Measures. The CIs capture 15 
percent of the budget of all structural funds, and they are distributed in the context of own 
programmes of the Commission, outside the CSFs, dedicated to problems that are assumed 
to exist all over the union. Since 1994, the so-called Innovative Measures, accounting for 
0,4 percent of the ERDF, have been introduced a bit aside of the structural policy 
objectives. With these, the EU Commission tries to ameliorate the competitiveness of 
regional economies particularly by supporting the new economy and technological 
innovations as well as sustainable development.  
Accordingly, the EU Commission does not only distribute funds, but influences decisively 
the regional development programmes under which this distribution takes place, and even 
                                                            
15  Or, in the case of a minor support budget, into Single Programme Documents (SPD) that are established 
in a somewhat facilitated procedure.  25 
chooses projects. By its programme oriented concept, it also takes influence on additional 
national policy measures in favour of the regions under support. The Agenda 2000 
provides for shaping the administration of the structural policies more efficient, and their 
execution more flexible and more decentralised. However, it also provides for defining the 
priorities of the structural policy more selective and more precise which is in obvious 
contrast to the former. In fact, the Council Regulation No 1260/1999 “laying down general 
provisions on the Structural Funds” for the period 2000-2006 as well as the supplementing 
guide-lines submitted by the Commission contradict any impression of a proper reversal of 
EU structural policy. Rather, they confirm the tradition of a continuous refining of 
objectives and procedures thereby further strengthening the influence of the EU on regions.   
Obviously, the EU structural policy violates the principle of subsidiarity as it takes 
prerogatives with hardly any noticeable regional externalities. It violates the principle of 
equivalence particularly by its additionality concept and also by the joint formulation of 
policy measures, by which any accountability is blurred. The EU structural policy 
overstates the principle of coordination largely, thereby also violating the principle of 
competition as it seeks to include national structural policy in an all-embracing concept 
angled at union-wide objectives. Also, criticism concerns the dominance of political 
redistributive objectives and the intransparency in decision-making.  
Moreover, the effectiveness of the structural funds are very much at doubt. In spite of the 
huge efforts and resources that are spent in substantiating the alleged objectives, the funds 
are distributed primarily according to national quota that correspond to the per capita 
income of the EU members (Stehn 1994). Accordingly, the highest amounts per capita go 
to Ireland, Greece, Spain und Portugal, the lowest to Germany (before re-unification), the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark (table 2). Also, the redistributive power of structural 
actions is very low (though larger than any other expenditures). Espasa (2002) estimates 
income elasticities and indicators of the redistributive power of the diverse EU 
expenditures as well as the revenues. According to her calculations, differentials in 
regional income after being corrected for structural funds aid account for about 97,7 
percent of the initial income differentials.16 If one takes into consideration the whole EU 
budget, this ratio goes up to 98,1 percent due to the regressive effects of the EU revenues 
and some of the expenditures. 
All in all, the conclusion of Jackman (1995) is still valid: “From an economic point of 
view, the correct policy is reasonably obvious. The Structural and Cohesion Funds, and the 
                                                            
16  Referring to the calculations in ECU and on the basis of the flow approach, cf. Espasa (2002). 26 
CAP, for that matter, should all be abolished. This would bring direct and substantial 
benefits to the people of Western Europe at the same time as removing a barrier to the 
accession of CEE countries.“ He concedes a need for „‘grandfather’ clauses to buy off 
existing beneficiaries“. But he sees „no way that the accession of the CEE countries can be 
contemplated without a substantial scaling down of annual expenditures under these 
programmes.” With respect to the question whether the Agenda 2000 effectively prepared 
the floor for enlargement the academic community remains sceptic to negative. The 
Agenda 2000 is not coping with the challenges of accession despite the progress thathas 
been made. Stehn (1999) looks at the Agenda 2000 more as an “ouverture for than as the 
grand finale of the reform process in the course of enlargement”. 
3.2.2. Control of regional state aid 
The second pillar of EU regional policy is the control of the member states’ regional aid by 
the Directorate-General Competition (former DG ). Like, the other pillar, the control of 
regional state aid has increasingly been used to shape regional policy at all levels of 
administration according to EU intentions. 
The control of national state aid is one of the prior prerogatives of the EU Commission 
constituted in the EU treaty in order to guarantee for a common market with an undistorted 
competition. Article 92 (3), however, provides that regional state aid promoting the 
economic development of areas with an „abnormally low standard of living“ or „serious 
underemployment“, in contrast to sectoral state aid, is considered to be compatible with the 
common market. In 1971, the Commisssion passed the first „Guidelines on national 
regional aid“ constituting rules for the derogation of national regional aid from the general 
prohibition of state aid. These guidelines have been supplemented, refined and updated 
continuously since. Upper limits for aid rates have been generated, expressed as a 
maximum net grant equivalent, and graduated in accordance with four different 
development levels of regions. Rules for achieving transparency of regional aid have been 
set up. Also, the Commission developed criteria for the eligibility of regions to national 
regional aid in relation to the Community and national average of GDP per capita and the 
unemployment rate.17 At the same time, national ceilings for the population covered by 
                                                            
17 The threshold for eligibility of regions as compared to the national average is related to the EU average 
according to the formula: 


















  where the basic threshold is established uniquely at 85 percent for GDP per capita and at 115 percent for 
the unemployment rate. Accordingly, the lower the national development level is compared to EU 27 
regional aid must be observed; for the period  from 2000-2006, for instance, they reach 
from a ceiling of 15 percent coverage for the Netherlands up to a ceiling of 100 percent 
coverage for Ireland, Greece, and Portugal (EU Commission 1999). Moreover, since 1985, 
the national regional aid is to be granted only in the context of a coordinated regional 
development program that includes also the grants from the EU structural funds. 
Hence, more and more, the control of national regional aid as a means to defend 
competition in the union while limiting a race on subsidies moved to the background 
whereas it became an instrument of integrating national regional aid into an all-embracing 
European regional policy. To be sure, the success of this integration does not seem to be 
very high by now – according to Martin’s (1998) estimations, national support schemes 
seem to step in where EU support is missing thus resulting in a more or less equivalent 
support at least for all problem regions, rich or poor (objective 1 and 2). Still, according to 
our considerations on an optimal design of regional policy, an attempt to further coordinate 
these different layers of administration is not desirable. It destroys the accountability for 
regional policy and disregards the differing functions regional policy has to fulfil at the EU 
level as compared to the national, regional or local level: to serve the needs of a certain 
allocative compensation for possible disadvantages from integration and to serve the but 
small distributive preference for union-wide equality. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we analysed in how far a case for regional policy at the EU level arises from 
progress in European integration, and what role the EU should play as compared to the role 
it actually does play. Three major conclusions may be drawn: 
(i) Due to the general uncertainties of our findings both on theoretical and empirical 
grounds, a case for an allocative as well as a distributive regional policy cannot be 
excluded. However, in view of the large amount of taxpayers’s money affected, and in 
view of the doubts concerning the gravity of the cohesion problem as well as the efficacy 
of regional policy to solve it, a careful empirical investigation is required to prove the 
adequacy of regional policy, particularly at EU level.  
(ii) Our considerations on an optimal design of regional policy at the EU level lead us to 
recommend a triple strategy: 
                                                                                                                                                                                
average the higher may the development level of the respective region be compared to the national 
average — it may even surmount the national average (EU Commission 1998).  28 
−  Lowering transaction costs by further reducing remaining trade barriers; 
−  organizing unconditioned but limited financial transfers from rich to poor regions; 
−  allowing for locational competition of regions with a great variety of  regional settings, 
combined with a certain control against dumping practices and with a monitoring 
process of policy measures and their effects. 
(iii) The EU regional policy, the structural funds as well as the control of regional state aid, 
in spite of recent reform efforts, does not comply with this strategy, and is not apt to cope 
with the challenges of east enlargement. The EU structural policy violates the principle of 
subsidiarity, the principle of equivalence (by its additionality concept), and overstates the 
principle of coordination, thereby also violating the principle of competition. The control 
of national regional aid has become an instrument of integrating this aid into an all-
embracing European regional policy thereby destroying the accountability for policy 
measures and disregarding the differing functions regional policy has to fulfil at the EU 
level as compared to the national, regional or local level. 
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